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NEGLIGENCE-BREACH OF DUTY-LIABILITY OF TELEPHONE COMPANY FOR 
FAILURE TO RELAY FIRE ALARM-Upon discovering a fire within his busi-
ness building, plaintiff immediately went to the telephone and dialed the 
operator. After telling her his address and requesting that she call the 
fire department, he left the telephone to fight the fire.. The message was 
not transmitted. When the fire department finally arrived in response 
to an alarm by a neighbor, the fire was out of control and the entire build-
ing was destroyed. Plaintiff sought damages, alleging that the telephone 
company held itself out to the public as willing to convey messages in 
case of emergency, and that failure to transmit his message caused the 
building to be destroyed. The trial court granted defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. On appeal, held, reversed. While defendant was 
under no duty to deliver messages, if it voluntarily assumed such a duty 
in case of emergency, it must exercise reasonable care in performing it 
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or become liable in tort to those who rely upon such assumption 0£ duty. 
Abresch v. Northwestern Bell Telephon.e Co., (Minn. 1956) 75 _N.W. 
(2d) 206. . 
Ordinarily a telephone subscriber may not recover from a telephone 
company special damages caused by a failure of services.1 If the action 
is regarded as based upon a subscription contract, the rule of Hadley 
v. Baxendale2 is usually imposed, and this type of liability is found to 
have been beyond the contemplation of the parties. 3 Strong arguments 
have been made in favor of imputing knowledge of emergency uses of 
telephone service to the companies,4 but the limitation is quite uniformly 
imposed. Similar difficulties are confronted when the action is viewed as 
one in tort for negligence. Courts generally treat the damages as too 
remote and specula~ive and find no proximate cause as a. matter of law.5 
The typical statement in cases involving reporting of fires is that too 
many assumptions must be made to trace the damage to the failure of 
service,6 although naturally this varies with the fact situation. Where the 
telephone company simply fails to relay a message at the subscriber's 
request, there is no breach of co}J.tract, for it is normally not within the 
function of telephone companies to relay messages.7 It may be said that 
acceptance of a message by the operator forms a new contract which binds 
the company because the practice is within the operator's apparent author-
ity, 8 but this analysis is open to criticism. Consideration for this second 
contract might be surmounted by theories of detrimental reliance by the 
subscriber, but it clearly is not the custom for operators to accept messages 
and make contracts for their employers in modern times.9 In any event, the 
express prohibition against accepting messages utilized by telephone com-
panies makes this question moot.10 A plaintiff is thus left without a 
1 The various theories of liability are discussed in 3 DRAKE L. REv. 82 (1954). 
2 9 Ex. 431, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
3 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Norwood, 212 Ark. 763 207 S.W. (2d) 733 (1948). 
Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E. (2d) 434 (1936), _noted in 46 
YALE L. J. 167 (1936); Ban;ett v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., ·so N.H. 354, 117 A. 
264 (1922). See also Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 245 N.Y. 284, 157 
N.E. 140 (1927). 
4 See the dissent in Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., note 3 supra, at 310. For argu-
ment against imputing notice, see 33 MINN. L. REv. 191 (1949). 
6 Lebanon, Louisville, & Lexington Tel. Co. v. Lanham Lumber Co., 131 Ky. 718, 
115 S.W. 824 (1909); Volquardsen v. Tel. Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N.W. 928 (1910). Many 
of the cases are discussed in Foss v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 Wash. (2d) 92, 173 P. 
(2d) 144 (1946). The court in the principal case follows the liberal view and lets the 
question of proximate cause go to the jury. Cf. Boldig v. Urban Tel. Co., 224 Wis. 93, 
271 N.W. 88 (1937). 
6 Volquardsen v. Tel. Co., note 5 supra, at 83. 
7 Mentzer v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 276 Mass. 478, 177 N.E. 549 (1931), noted 
in 45 HARV. L. REv. 393 (1931), 11 BoST. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 600 (1931), 80 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 
316 (1931). 
8 Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Brandon, 154 Ky. 644, 157 S.W. 1119 (1913). But 
see Mentzer v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., note 8 supra. 
9 See Clay v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., (D.C. Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 995. 
10 See the regulation quoted in principal case at 209. 
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remedy unless he can establish a tort duty to relay the message and then 
seek recovery in a negligence action. In the principal case defendant is 
said to have assumed a duty if it represents that it will deliver messages 
in certain cases of emergency, and it is consequently liable for failure to 
perform when plaintiff is injured by his reliance upon such representa-
tions. This result is in accord with the modern approach to the problem 
of enforcing gratuitous promises,11 as opposed to the old view that there 
was no liability for non-performance.12 The reliance doctrine is applicable 
to this situation because plaintiff did have an alternative means of sum-
moning the fire department-he could have called it directly. While the 
principal case illustrates a liberal view toward both the enforcement of 
gratuitous promises and the presentation of the proximate cause question to 
the jury, its scope is limited to the comparatively rare situation before it. 
The assumption of duty approach utilized in the principal case is inap-
plicable to the ordinary failure of service situation since there is no 
effective alternative to the use of the telephone in an emergency.13 The 
telephone is the best and often only means of communication available 
to the subscriber. In the light of the common use of the telephone for 
emergency purposes and the fact that this is one of the principal reasons 
for subscribing, it would seem not unreasonable to charge the company 
with knowledge of this purpose and find some degree of liability to have 
been contemplated by the parties to the subscription contract. However, 
this development does not appear likely, and liability outside of the 
atypical assumption of duty situation as presented in the principal case 
will continue to be difficult to establish. 
Cyril Moscow, S.Ed. 
ll The court relies upon 2 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §325 (1934) and 2 AGENCY R.EsTATE-
MENT §378 (1933). See generally Seavey, "Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other· 
Conduct," 64 HARV. L. REv. 913 (1951); PROSSER,. TORTS, 2d ed., §38 (1955). See, also, 
l CONTRACTS R.EsTATEMENT §90 (1932). 
12 The leading case is Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. (N .Y.) 84 (1809). 
13 See 2 TORTS R.EsTATEMENT §325, comment b (1934), which states, ". • • apart 
from any contract which he may have entered into with the other, the actor is liable 
only to the extent to which the alternative protection, which he has induced the other 
to refrain from procuring, would have been effective." The availability of other means 
of calling fire protection thus becomes crucial in the ascertainment of liability. To the 
same effect see 2 AGENCY R.EsTATEMENT §401, comment b (1933). 
